Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)
Announced on the same day as Hamdi[1] and Rasul,[2] Rumsfeld v. Padilla was the lone enemy combatant case of the trio to receive a ruling in favor of the government. The unique facts of Padilla involved the habeas petition of Jose Padilla, an American citizen who had been arrested by federal agents in connection with a grand jury investigation into the September 11th terrorist attacks.[3] While in custody, President Bush designated Padilla an “enemy combatant” and ordered he be transferred to military custody.[4] The Department of Defense subsequently took custody over Padilla and transported him to a naval brig in South Carolina.[5]
Two days following his transfer to the South Carolina brig, Padilla (through his counsel) filed a habeas petition in the Southern District of New York challenging his “enemy combatant” designation and detention.[6] The petition “alleged that Padilla’s military detention violate[d] the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the Suspension Clause,” and named President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Brig Commander Melanie A. Marr as respondents.[7]
Writing for a five Justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged two issues presented by Padilla’s habeas petition. The first concerned “whether Padilla properly file[d] his habeas petition in the Southern District of New York.”[8] In other words, whether the Southern District of New York had subject matter jurisdiction over Padilla’s claim. The second question addressed whether “the President possess[ed the] authority to detain Padilla militarily.”[9]
Justice Rehnquist opened his opinion by answering the jurisdictional question in the negative, finding that Padilla had improperly filed his habeas petition in the Southern District of New York.[10] The Chief Justice divided this analysis into two more basic questions: (1) “Who is the proper respondent to [the] petition? And, (2) “Does the Southern District have jurisdiction over him or her?”[11]
Relying on Wales v. Whitney, the Justice Rehnquist held that in habeas petitions challenging physical confinement, the proper respondent is the individual “who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court.”[12] Commander Marr of the naval brig where Padilla remained imprisoned was thus the proper respondent in the case.[13] Since the Southern District of New York did not have personal jurisdiction over Commander Marr, the district court could not hear Padilla’s habeas petition.[14]
Having ruled in this manner on the jurisdictional issue, Justice Rehnquist chose to forego any discussion of the second question regarding Executive Authority.[15]
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[1] Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
[2] Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
[3] Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004); Brian D. Fahy, Given an Inch, the Detainee Effort to Take a Mile: The Detainee Legislation and the Dangers of the “Litigation Weapon in Unrestrained Enemy Hands,” 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 129, 155 (2008).
[4] Padilla, 542 U.S. at 431; Fahy, at 155.
[5] Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 430.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at 434.
[12] Id. at 435 (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1973)).
[13] Id. at 436, 447.
[14] Id. at 442.
[15] Id. at 430.