Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court reviewed the habeas petition of Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni national who was captured in Afghanistan and transferred to Guantanamo in June 2002.[1] While detained at Guantanamo, the U.S. government charged Hamdan with conspiracy and a CSRT affirmed his “enemy combatant” status.[2] On July 3, 2003, President Bush “designated Hamdan for trial by military commission.”[3]
On April 6, 2004, Hamdan filed a habeas petition in the Washington, D.C. District Court, challenging the Executive Branch’s plan to prosecute him by military commission.[4] Hamdan claimed that the military commission lacked authority to try him because no “congressional Act nor the common law of war” had granted such authority and that the commissions’ procedures “violate[d] the most basic tenets of military and international law.”[5] The district court granted Hamdan’s habeas petition, holding that the government could not try Hamdan before a military commission because the current commissions’ procedures were inconsistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and violated Geneva Convention principles.[6] On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed and reinstated the government’s ability to try Hamdan before a military commission.[7]
On November 7, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.[8] Before the Supreme Court was able to hear the case, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).[9] The DTA had amended the federal habeas statute to deny every “court, justice, or judge” jurisdiction over habeas claims by alien Guantanamo detainees.[10] Thus, in addition to Hamdan’s claim regarding the legality of the military commissions, the DTA presented the Court with the threshold question of whether it still maintained subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case that was pending at the time of the DTA’s enactment.
The Supreme Court first answered to the jurisdictional question. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens responded to the newly enacted DTA by reasoning that Congress “had not intended to eliminate [the Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction.”[11] Justice Stevens founded the Court’s analysis upon “ordinary principles of statutory construction,” and maintained that such an interpretive approach rebuts any claims by the government that the DTA removes federal court jurisdiction over pending cases.[12]
Next, the Court discussed the merits of Hamdan’s challenge. Justice Stevens began by recognizing that as a government of limited powers, all Executive and Legislative undertakings must find constitutional authorization.[13] Considering the Executive has no inherent constitutional powers to create military commissions, such authorization “can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in a time of war.”[14] Thus, notwithstanding cases of “controlling necessity,” even during war the President must receive congressional authorization before convening military commissions.[15]
Justice Stevens concluded that the President had failed to acquire any such authorization. While the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) had “activated the President’s war powers,” neither the AUMF nor the DTA had bestowed upon the president “authority to convene military commissions.”[16] Furthermore, even had the President secured congressional authorization, the Court found that the commissions violated the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.[17] Justice Stevens specifically referenced various procedures governing Hamdan’s trial that violated these laws.[18]
The conclusion of Justice Stevens’ opinion helpfully identifies the scope of the Court’s holding. Justice Stevens reminds us that Hamdan’s habeas petition was not challenging “the Government’s power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities in order to prevent” potential harm.[19] Rather, Hamdan’s challenge focused specifically on the Executive’s ability to bring criminal charges against him in one of the aforementioned military commissions.[20] Responding to that specific claim, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion held that the Bush Administration’s military commissions were illegal for failing to receive congressional authorization and for violating the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.
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[1] Robert J. Pushaw, Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic? 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1975, 2010 (2009).
[2] Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006).
[3] Id.; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
[4] Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
[5] Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
[6] Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 173-74.
[7] Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
[8] Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 126 S. Ct. 622 (cert. granted)
[9] Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005 (2005)(hereinafter DTA); Pushaw, supra note 1, at 2000.
[10] DTA § 1005(e); Pushaw, supra note 1, at 2000.
[11] Pushaw, supra note 1, at 2011; See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575-76.
[12] Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575-76.
[13] Id. at 591.
[14] Id. at 591.
[15] Id. at 592.
[16] Id. at 593-94.
[17] Id. at 613; Pushaw, supra note 1, at 2000.
[18] Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613.
[19] Id. at 635.
[20] Id. at 635.
[JF1][Issue of Abstention – Section III of opinion – do you want to me include anything on this matter?]