Thinking through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11is one of twenty four articles featured inAmericans On War & Peace, described by its editors Russell C. Leong and Don T. Nakanishi as “the first book to respond to the tragic world events of September 11, 2001 from Asian American perspectives, from the vantage points of those whose lives and communities in America have been forged both by war and by peace.” Jerry Kang,Thinking through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11,in Americans On War & Peace7 and 9/11, (pg) (Russell C. Leong and Don T. Nakanishi eds., 2001). Jerry Kang’s piece draws parallels between the experience of Japanese Americans during internment with similar obstacles facing South Asian and Arab Americans post-9/11, mainly focusing on the systematic, state-sanctioned deprivations of civil liberties for both groups.
The article’s first section titled “What 12/7 Has to Teach about 9/11: Race Matters,” begins with a description of events following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, where both the public and government officials almost immediately scapegoated Japanese Americans. Id.at 55. Stereotypes highlighting the “foreignness” of Japanese Americans were supplemented and amplified in statements and documents by military officials in charge of enforcing internment orders. Id. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 authorizing military commanders on the West Coast to implement necessary measures to preserve national security. Id. at 56. By criminalizing disobedience and strict enforcement, by December of 1942, the War Relocation Authority had effectively concentrated nearly all Japanese on the West Coast. Id. Kang briefly mentions constitutional challenges to curfew, exclusion, and internment brought in the 1940s cases of Hirabayshi, Yasui, and Korematsu, respectively. Id. Courts in all three cases deferred to the government’s claims of “military necessity,” and upholding the military’s actions as constitutionally sound. Id. In 1982, a Congressional commission admitted that the internment was a wartime mistake, and since then all branches of the US government have apologized. Id.
Kang then poses the question, “What lessons then should we learn from this mistake [by the government]?” Id. He first answers, that perhaps this was just an accident where during a crisis, “the Supreme Court erred because it was not given complete, accurate information.” Id. Historical record shows that “smoking gun” evidence was in fact suppressed by different branches of government and once revealed, it was used to reverse the criminal convictions of the World War II litigants–Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu. Id. If this lesson was in fact learned in time for the present post-9/11 context, it would “counsel against law enforcement zeal that prevents a fair balanced consideration of all the facts by our political leaders, the judiciary, and the American people.” Id. Clearly, the US has not learned this lesson.
Kang further argues that this lesson was already known to justices of the Supreme Court who understood the racism being perpetuated by the internment under the guise of national security. Id. at 57. He explains, “the more important lesson, then, is not that wartime creates mistakes; instead, it is that wartime coupled with racism and intolerance creates particular types of mistakes,”–namely, an overestimation of threat posed by racial others and a simultaneous underestimation of the burden imposed upon these others, by the US’s exaggerated responses perceived threats. Id.
The article’s second section, “Thinking through Profiling” examines the central role racial profiling played in internment and the role it continues to play in the government’s post-9/11 actions. How can the US be sure that something like the internment will never happen again, what if it already has? More specifically, what constitutes the line between enough and too much racial profiling–mere search and surveillance based on one’s race, Special Registration, detainment? Kang further dissects the justifications for racial profiling, weighing the costs incurred by the people profiled with the benefit (to everyone) of preventing a future terrorist attack–after all, safety benefits everyone. Id.
Kang offers six cautionary observations in this cost-benefit analysis of racial profiling.
- First, Kang asks the reader to imagine that roughly 100 out of 10 million (or 0.001%) of Brown men in the US are bona fide terrorists. Id. Comparing that to the 350,000 men arrested for violent crimes out of 135 million men in the US (a percentage of 0.26 percent), Kang asks, “Should we stop and search all men because they may act violently?” Id. Admitting that the numbers are speculative, Kang claims that even if the percentages are higher in this case, Americans should demand the best data available from our government to check reckless profiling. Id.
- Second, Kang warns about the human tendency to commit logical flaws, especially surrounding probabilities. Id. He explains, “the fact that 100 percent of terrorists are Arab-looking men does not mean that 100 percent of Arab-looking men are terrorists.” Id. He advises us to parse this or any data correctly, rather than accepting data that may be premised on logical flaws. Id.
- Third, Kang cautions his readers to not overestimate the benefit of racial profiling. Id. at 58-59. For instance, many of the 9/11 terrorists hardly behaved like Muslim fundamentalists, contrary to the universal profile of a terrorist. Id. at 59. Racial profiling operates on outward appearances and stereotypes (a profile) and is therefore oftentimes misleading and ineffective at preventing future dangers.Further, valuable resources are wasted on “false positives” those who fit the profile but are not terrorists. Id. If this is indeed a true cost benefit analysis, and the goal of racial profiling of this type is to save lives, far more lives can be saved through other measures, for instance, additional airbags in vehicles. Id.
- Fourth, Kang cautions us not underestimate the burden of racial profiling onto those profiled. Id. at 60. Giving the example of a young Black man profiled as a rapist, Kang invites the reader to imagine the hypothetical burden to get a sense of the weight of young man’s lost dignity. Id.
- Fifth, Kang asks us to understand the context and consequences of profiling–why did the profile become constructed? What is keeping it in place? One of the reasons offered by the Court for Japanese American internment was that America’s mistreatment of the group had made it disloyal and thus a threat to US security. Id. Will this same Catch-22 reasoning be used against Arab Americans in the future? Id.
- Lastly, Kang notes that the prior observations have been examining profiling “on the numbers.” Id. at 61. He asks, “But aren’t moral principles embedded in our Constitution supposed to trump utilitarian calculations?” Id. Kang claims that much of this talk of morality is lost in the language of constitutional law. Id. However, he finds this all the more reason to demand government leaders to perform the cost-benefit analysis publicly before adopting any profiling measures. Id.
Kang concludes by acknowledging that we are living through a period of terror. Id. To truly learn a lesson from the internment–“that racism warps what we honestly believe to be rational calculations, especially in times of crisis”–we must understand that these lessons do not secure safety from terrorism and attack. Id. at 62. Instead, Kang reminds us that the “Constitution in itself does not make our nation strong. It merely makes us worthy of strength.” Id. The challenge for the nation then becomes learning to hone that strength, and only sparingly applying it after lengthy, public cost-benefit analyses and moral considerations.
| Author: Aparna Garg |