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UNITED STATES NAVAL ADMINISTRATION

IN WORLD WAR II

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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SUPPLEMENT: Appendices to various Parts of History. (In separate volumes)	

Intelligence Branch, and established as the Special Activities Branch (16-2) without change in its functions. Its functions included the obtaining, training and administering secret agents. In June this section had assumed responsibility for information on captured enemy naval equipment. In connection with its work of developing a secret undercover intelligence service, it maintained liaison with the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and subsequently with the Office of Strategic Services when the former was absorbed by the latter. Another important function was added to ONI, when on 7 October 1942 the Special Warfare Branch (Op-16-W) was established with control over psychological warfare and bacteriological warfare. Among its tasks was the processing of naval intelligence for the confidential guidance of the Psychological Warfare Planning Board of the Overseas Branch of ONI, and the supplying of naval information to the Overseas Branch.

C. DELIMITATION OF ACTIVITIES AMONG GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

It was early realized that the complex functions of Naval Intelligence would bring it into close relationship with other branches of the government but more particularly with the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Strategic Services (formerly the Office of the Coordinator of Information). Of less importance were the intelligence and investigative agencies of the State Department, Treasury Department and Department of Commerce. In this connection, it is to be remembered, that the mission of ONI specifically states that information is to be collected, evaluated,

and disseminated "utilizing to the maximum extent practicable the services of other agencies of the Government."⁶²

In the pre-war period thought had been given to plans for a unified government intelligence service. On 8 April 1929, Glenn Howell (Comdir.?), then district intelligence officer of the Third Naval District, in a letter to the Director of Naval Intelligence mentioned such a plan for a unified service and explained that the idea had been initiated by a Mr. Gads of the F.B.I. The letter mentioned that the scheme "proposes that the various intelligence units of the government be left intact exactly as they are now but that they may be considered as spokes of a wheel, the hub of which is a Central Intelligence. Into this Central Intelligence pours all information from the various spokes -- Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Secret Service, Department of Justice, Department of Commerce. This is roughly the British system as he understands it..."⁶³

While preparations for war were reaching their final stages, the question of overlapping functions and conflicting jurisdiction arose among the various government investigative agencies. The first official action taken on this situation was a confidential memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dated 26 June 1939 and addressed to the Secretaries of the State, Treasury, War, Navy, Commerce and the Attorney General and the Postmaster General, declaring that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters was to be

62. DNI ltr., to CNO June 1945. Subject: Division of Naval Intelligence, Organization and Function of. (Prepared by Op-16-A-8)

63. Conf. ltr. from DIO, Third N.D. to Director Naval Intelligence dated 8 Apr, 1929 in War Plans File (Op-16-X).

controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies were to function as a committee to coordinate their activities. Furthermore, the letter stated that no investigations were to be conducted by any investigative agency into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage or sabotage except by the three branches mentioned above.⁶⁴

Supplementing this Presidential memorandum, was a directive from J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to all law enforcement officers and dated 6 September 1939, quoting a formal statement from the President to the effect that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was to handle investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations. In order that the task might be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis, all law enforcement officers were requested to turn over promptly to the nearest FBI representative all information on the above fields.⁶⁵

The first formal agreement delimiting the counter-intelligence functions of Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was titled "Proposal for Coordination" and was signed by the heads of these agencies on 5 June 1940.⁶⁶ In connection

64. Conf. Memo from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dated 26 June 1939. See Appendix P.

65. Ltr. from J. Edgar Hoover to All Law Enforcement Officers dated 6 Sept. 1939. Appendix Q.

66. Conf. Memo "Proposal For Coordination of FBI, ONI and MID" signed by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson and John Edgar Hoover, dated 5 June 1940. Appendix R.

with the statement on spheres of responsibility, it explained that the responsible agency was not alone interested or would not necessarily work alone in that field. "Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity," it was stated.

Briefly expressed, FBI was to be responsible for all investigations of espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage involving civilians in the United States and in territories with certain exceptions. This agency was to act as the coordinating head of all civilian organizations furnishing information relating to subversive movements. Furthermore, FBI was to assume responsibility for the investigation of all cases in the above categories directed from foreign countries when the State, War and Navy Departments specifically requested investigation. The Military Intelligence Division of the Army was to handle investigation of cases in the military establishment, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. It was also expected to assume responsibility for the investigation of cases involving citizens in the Canal Zones, the Republic of Panama and the Philippine Islands. The Office of ONI was to investigate and dispose of cases in the naval establishment including civilians under naval employ or control and all civilians in Guam and American Samoa. Also, FBI was to keep the other two agencies informed of developments affecting plants engaged in Army or Navy contracts, developments affecting important utilities, developments affecting critical points of transportation or communication systems, cases of actual or strongly presumptive espionage or sabotage.⁶⁷

⁶⁷. Conf. Memo "Proposal for Coordination", ibid.